

University of Udine  
Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Physics

# MODELLING MULTI-AGENT EPISTEMIC PLANNING IN ASP



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Programming

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# Overview



## Chapter 1

# Multi-Agent Epistemic Planning

# Introduction



## Epistemic Reasoning

Reasoning not only about agents' perception of the world but also about agents' knowledge and/or beliefs of her and others' beliefs.

# Introduction



## Epistemic Reasoning


Reasoning not only about agents' perception of the world but also about agents' knowledge and/or beliefs of her and others' beliefs.

## Multi-agent Epistemic Planning Problem **bolander2011epistemic**

Finding plans where the goals can refer to:

- the state of the world
- the knowledge and/or the beliefs of the agents

# An Example




# An Example



## Initial State

- Snoopy and Charlie are looking while Lucy is  $\neg$ looking
- No one knows the coin position.




# An Example



## Goal State

- Charlie knows the coin position
- Lucy knows that Charlie knows the coin position
- Snoopy does not know anything about the plan execution





# Notations



Given a set of agents

**Belief formulae**

where  $ag \in , \alpha \subseteq$

We use the operators  $B_{ag}$  and  $C_{\alpha}$  to model the beliefs and the common knowledge of the agents.



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### Properties of $B_{ag}$

**KD45** and **S5** Axioms

Given the fluent formulae  $\phi, \psi$  and the worlds  $i, j$

$$D \neg R_i \perp \qquad BK$$

$$K (R_i \phi \wedge R_i (\phi \implies \psi)) \implies R_i \psi \qquad BK$$

$$T R_i \phi \implies \phi \qquad K$$

$$4 R_i \phi \implies R_i R_i \phi \qquad BK$$

$$5 \neg R_i \phi \implies R_i \neg R_i \phi \qquad BK$$

## Chapter 2

# Possibilities



- Introduced by Gerbrandy and Groeneveld **Gerbrandy1997**
- Used to represent multi-agent information change
- Based on non-well-founded sets



## Possibility Gerbrandy1997

Let  $\mathcal{U}$  be a set of agents and  $\mathcal{F}$  a set of propositional variables:

- A possibility  $u$  is a function that assigns to each propositional variable  $l \in \mathcal{F}$  a truth value  $u(l) \in \{0, 1\}$  and to each agent  $ag \in \mathcal{U}$  a set of possibilities  $u(ag) = \sigma$  (information state).

Intuitively ...

- The possibility  $u$  is a possible interpretation of the world and of the agents' beliefs
- $u(l)$  specifies the truth value of the literal  $l$
- $u(ag)$  is the set of all the interpretations the agent  $ag$  considers possible in  $u$
- Representable with graphs: we will use graph terminology

## Chapter 3

# The action language $m\mathcal{A}^\rho$

# Action types



We introduced the action language  $m\mathcal{A}^p$  in **Fab20**

- Used to describe MEP problems
- Uses possibilities as states
- Actions preconditions: belief formulae



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**Three** types of actions:

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Charlie *opens* the box





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Charlie *opens* the box
- Sensing: senses the true value of a fluent  
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**Three** types of actions:

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Charlie *opens* the box
- Sensing: senses the true value of a fluent  
Charlie *peeks* inside the box
- Announcement: announces the fluent to other agents  
Charlie *announces* the coin position



# Observability Relations



An execution of an action might change or not an agents' belief accordingly to her degree of awareness

Action type	Full observers	Partial Observers	Oblivious
Ontic	✓		✓
Sensing	✓	✓	✓
Announcement	✓	✓	✓

## Chapter 4

# PLATO



PLATO, ePistemic muLti-agent Answer seT programming sOlver:

- Declarative encoding in ASP of MEP
- Based on the language  $m\mathcal{A}^p$
- Main components: *initial state generation*, *entailment*, *transition function*
- Exploits *clingo*'s multi-shot capabilities **Geb19**
- Formal proof of correctness

# Encoding possibilities



Let  $u$  be a possibility.

## ASP encoding: possibilities

We encode  $u$  with the atom `possible_world( $T_u, R_u, P_u$ )`, where:

- $T_u$  tells us when  $u$  was created
- $R_u$  is the *repetition* of  $u$
- $P_u$  is the numerical index of  $u$



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### ASP encoding: pointed possibility

If  $u$  is the possibility that represents the *real configuration* of the world, we encode it with the atom `pointed( $T_u, R_u, P_u$ )`.

When the context is clear we will use *only*  $P_u$  instead of  $(T_u, R_u, P_u)$ .

# Encoding possibilities



Let  $u, v$  be two possibilities, let  $ag$  be an agent and let  $F$  be a fluent.

ASP encoding: information states

We encode  $v \in u(ag)$  with the atom `believes( $P_u, P_v, ag$ )`.



# Encoding possibilities



Let  $u, v$  be two possibilities, let  $ag$  be an agent and let  $F$  be a fluent.

## ASP encoding: information states

We encode  $v \in u(ag)$  with the atom  $\text{believes}(P_u, P_v, ag)$ .

## ASP encoding: interpretations

We encode  $u(F) = 1$  with the atom  $\text{holds}(P_u, F)$ .



Given a possibility  $P$  and a belief formula  $F$ .



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```
entails      (P,          F)      :- holds(P,F), fluent(F).
entails      (P,      neg(F))     :- not entails(P,F).
entails      (P,  and(F1,F2))     :- entails(P,F1), entails(P,F2).
entails      (P,    or(F1,F2))    :- entails(P,F1).
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# Ontic actions



Let *open* be an ontic action such that

- It sets the fluent *opened* to true
- Only ?? and ?? are attentive




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


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$\text{pw}(u'_i) :- \text{pointed}(u_1), \text{reaches}(u_1, u_i, \text{AGS}), \text{fully\_obs}(\text{AGS}). \quad (i \in \{1, 2\})$



$u_1(\mathcal{F}) = \{\text{head}, \text{looking}_{\text{Charlie}}, \text{looking}_{\text{Snoopy}}\}$

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


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$\text{believes}(u'_i, u'_j, AG) :- \text{pw}(u'_i), \text{pw}(u'_j), \text{fully\_obs}(AG), \quad (i, j \in \{1, 2\})$   
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
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# Sensing/Announcement actions



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


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
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$\text{pw}(u''_1) :- \text{pointed}(u'_1), \text{reaches}(u'_1, u'_1, \text{AGS}), \text{fully\_obs}(\text{AGS}), \text{holds\_sensed}(u_1, \text{peek}).$




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$\text{pw}(u_2'')$  :-  $\text{pointed}(u_1')$ ,  $\text{reaches}(u_1', u_2', \text{AGS})$ ,  $\text{not\_oblivious}(\text{AGS})$ .




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 $\text{believes}(u_i', u_j', \text{AG}), \text{fully\_obs}(\text{AG}),$   
 $\text{holds\_sensed}(u_i, \text{peek}) = \text{holds\_sensed}(u_j, \text{peek}).$



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


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
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


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Let  $u, v$  be two possibilities and  $\psi$  be a belief formula.

### Entailment correctness

For each  $u$ , we have that  $\forall \psi \quad u \models_\Phi \psi$  iff  $u \models_\Gamma \psi$ .

### Initial state generation correctness

For each  $u, v$  such that  $u$  is the initial state in  $m\mathcal{A}^\rho$  and  $v$  is the initial state in PLATO then  $\forall \psi \quad u \models_\Phi \psi$  iff  $v \models_\Gamma \psi$ .

### Transition function correctness

Let  $a$  be an action instance. For each  $u, v$  such that  $\forall \psi \quad u \models_\Phi \psi$  iff  $v \models_\Gamma \psi$ , then  $\forall \psi \quad \Phi(a, u) \models_\Phi \psi$  iff  $\Gamma(a, v) \models_\Gamma \psi$ .

## Experimental evaluation



SC: $ \mathcal{AG}  = 9$ , $ \mathcal{F}  = 12$ , $ \mathcal{A}  = 14$				
$L$	many	frumpy	K-BIS	P-MAR
4	.24	.24	.03	<b>.007</b>
6	2.56	2.49	.16	<b>.04</b>
8	36.79	38.34	4.23	<b>.30</b>
9	204.52	146.343	5.79	<b>.83</b>
10	TO	839.27	7.36	<b>1.78</b>

Gr: $ \mathcal{AG}  = 3$ , $ \mathcal{F}  = 9$ , $ \mathcal{A}  = 24$				
$L$	Total	Ground	Solve	Atoms
3	.97	.60	.36	28'615
4	4.25	2.24	2.01	42'022
5	32.83	2.52	30.31	71'482
6	211.69	5.27	206.41	140'305
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CC.1: $ \mathcal{AG}  = 2$ , $ \mathcal{F}  = 10$ , $ \mathcal{A}  = 16$					CC.2: $ \mathcal{AG}  = 3$ , $ \mathcal{F}  = 13$ , $ \mathcal{A}  = 24$			
$L$	single	multi	K-BIS	P-MAR	single	multi	K-BIS	P-MAR
3	48.74	6.52	.08	<b>.02</b>	153.76	14.07	.13	<b>.03</b>
4	188.32	8.74	.16	<b>.03</b>	TO	28.02	.54	<b>.10</b>
5	TO	7.68	1.14	<b>.16</b>	TO	16.13	4.89	<b>.60</b>
6	1222.67	10.83	4.42	<b>0.64</b>	TO	14.84	12.66	<b>1.71</b>
7	TO	30.08	16.06	<b>2.61</b>	TO	56.48	142.06	<b>12.37</b>

## Chapter 5

# Conclusions

# Conclusions



- Exploited a declarative approach to implement Multi-Agent Epistemic Planning
- Improved readability and code maintenance
- Straightforward semantical adaptations
- Results comparable to the imperative approach
- Formal proof of correctness

# Future works



- Enhancement of the entailment rules
- Implementation of heuristics
- Formal proof of equivalence between  $m\mathcal{A}^*$  and  $m\mathcal{A}^p$
- We are using PLATO to implement novel concepts in MEP, such as trust, lies and misconceptions





Thank You  
for the attention

References

# References I

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# Other Planners

To the best of our knowledge ?? is the only *comprehensive* epistemic multi-agent planner.

Other planners with the best results in the literature are:

- ?? **muise2015planning**: translates into classical planning. Only deals with a finite level of nested beliefs.
- ?? **huang2017general**: does not support dynamic common knowledge.

# Domains I

- ▶ *Assembly Line* (**AL**): two agents are responsible for processing a different part of a product. They can fail in processing their part and inform the other of the status of her task. The agents decide to *assemble* the product or *restart*. Goal: the agents must assemble the product. We change the *depth* of the belief formulae.
- ▶ *Coin in the Box* (**CB**).  $n \geq 3$  agents are in a room. There is a closed box containing a coin. None of the agents know the coin position. One agent has the key. An agent may look inside the box to sense the state of the coin and also share the result.

## Domains II

- ▶ *Collaboration and Communication* (CC).  $n \geq 2$  agents move along a corridor with  $k \geq 2$  rooms in which  $m \geq 1$  boxes can be located. Agents can determine if a certain box is in the room they are in. They can communicate information about the boxes' position. Agents may move only to adjacent rooms.
- ▶ *Grapevine*.  $n \geq 2$  agents are located in  $k \geq 2$  rooms. Each agent  $ag$  knows a "secret" ( $s_{ag}$ ). Agents can move to an adjacent room and share their secret within the same room.
- ▶ *Selective Communication* (SC).  $n \geq 2$  agents within one of the  $k \geq 2$  rooms in a corridor. Agents can move to an adjacent room. In only one of the rooms, agents may acquire some information  $q$  and may communicate it to others.

# Finitary S5 Theories

## Finitary S5-theory son2014finitary

Let  $\phi$  be a fluent formula and let  $i \in \mathcal{AG}$  be an agent. A *finitary S5-theory* is a collection of formulae of the form:

$$(i) \phi \quad (ii) C \phi \quad (iii) C (B_i \phi \vee B_i \neg \phi) \quad (iv) C (\neg B_i \phi \wedge \neg B_i \neg \phi)$$


Each fluent  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  must appear in at least one of the formulae (ii)–(iv) (for at least one agent  $i \in \mathcal{AG}$ ).

A finitary S5-theory has *finitely many* S5-models up to equivalence.

# Initial state generation

Given


- $\mathcal{AG} = \{??, ??, ??\}$
- $\mathcal{F} = \{\text{opened, head, looking}_{ag}\} \text{ ag} \in \mathcal{AG}$




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Consider a formula of a finitary **S5** theory.



Formula type:




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- (i)  $\phi$

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Consider a formula of a finitary **S5** theory.



$$u_1(\mathcal{F}) = \{\text{head}, \text{looking}_{\text{Charlie}}, \text{looking}_{\text{Snoopy}}\}$$

$$u_2(\mathcal{F}) = \{\text{looking}_{\text{Charlie}}, \text{looking}_{\text{Snoopy}}\}$$


Formula type:

- (i)  $\phi$
- (ii)  $C \phi$


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Formula:

$$C (B_{\text{Lucy}} \text{head} \vee B_{\text{Lucy}} \neg \text{head})$$


Formula type:

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- (ii)  $C \phi$
- (iii)  $C (B_i \phi \vee B_i \neg \phi)$


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
- (i)  $\phi$
- (ii)  $C \phi$
- (iii)  $C (B_i \phi \vee B_i \neg \phi)$
- (iv)  $C (\neg B_i \phi \wedge \neg B_i \neg \phi)$

# From Possibilities to Kripke Structures

Considering a possibility

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A possibility




# From Possibilities to Kripke Structures

Considering a possibility

Can be expressed as a *system of equations*

A possibility



Its system of equation

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} w(p) = 1 & w(q) = 0 \\ v(p) = 1 & v(q) = 1 \\ u(p) = 0 & u(q) = 0 \\ w(A) = \{v\} & w(B) = \{\emptyset\} \\ v(A) = \{v\} & v(B) = \{u\} \\ u(A) = \{\emptyset\} & u(B) = \{\emptyset\} \end{array} \right.$$




# From Possibilities to Kripke Structures

Considering a possibility

Can be expressed as a *system of equations*

Systems of equations have unique solutions


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# From Possibilities to Kripke Structures


Considering a possibility

Can be expressed as a *system of equations*

Systems of equations have unique solutions

The solution decorates a Kripke structure


A possibility




Its system of equation

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The solution



Relative Kripke Structure





# From Possibilities to Kripke Structures


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
A possibility



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